The connection between the periods of when the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or Hashd al‑Sha’abi (Hashd hereafter) in 2014 and the outbreak of the anti-government protests in 2019 known as the Tishreen (October) protest movement and uprising are often overlooked due to the presupposed distinction between both events. Consequently, while one becomes a popular mobilization against an offensive during the states’ military collapse, the other one becomes a popular upheaval against the state’s failed governance, corruption, and sectarian politics. However, the Iran factor within both cases is a crucial element that must be considered when trying to even understand both Hashd and Tishreen separately. For the former, we witnessed Iran’s endeavor to further regenerate its agendas and influence through pre-existing players on the ground. For the latter, Iran’s attitude transitioned to a defensive one due to the prominent local anger and frustration with its position in Iraqi politics. This study aims to discuss the transition between both Hashd and Tishreen in the eyes of Iran’s influence in Iraq in an attempt to reflect upon a linkage that is worth emphasizing, rather than just explaining what they would represent.