



Center for Iranian Studies in Ankara

SAUDI INVESTMENT IN THE EAST: IMPLICATIONS FOR GWADAR-CHABAHAR RIVALRY

Ali Haider Saleem
Arhama Siddiqa
Muhammad Abbas Hassan





March 2020 © Center for Iranian Studies in Ankara (İRAM).

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be fully reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, published or broadcast without the prior written permission from İRAM. For electronic copies of this publication, visit iramcenter.org. Partial reproduction of the digital copy is possibly by giving an active link to www.iramcenter.org

The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of İRAM, its staff, or its trustees.

For electronic copies of this report, visit www.iramcenter.org.

Editor : Jennifer Enzo

Graphic Design : Hüseyin Kurt

ISBN :978-605-7559-53-1

Center for Iranian Studies in Ankara

Oğuzlar, 1397. St, 06520, Çankaya, Ankara / Türkiye

Phone: +90 (312) 284 55 02-03 | Fax: +90 (312) 284 55 04

e-mail : info@iramcenter.org | www.iramcenter.org-posta: info@iramcenter.org

Saudi Investment in the East: Implications for Gwadar-Chabahar Rivalry

Doğu'daki Suudi Yatırımları: Gwadar İçin Sonuçları-Çabahar'la Rekabet

سرمایه گذاری های عربستان سعودی در شرق؛ پیامدها برای رقابت گوادر- چابهار

Ali Haider Saleem

Ali Haider Saleem has been a researcher at the Institute of Strategic Studies since November 2016. His research focuses on regional integration and development issues. He holds an undergraduate degree in Economics from the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) and a graduate degree in Public Policy from Queen Mary University of London. He has also worked at National Defence University in Islamabad.

Arhama Siddiqa

Arhama Siddiqa is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI). She is a LUMS (2013) and Warwick (2014) alumnus. Her research areas are the Middle East and the role of major powers in South Asia. She regularly contributes to publications such as The Pakistan Observer, The Nation, and South Asian Voices (hosted by the Stimson Center). She was a 2017 Commonwealth Fellow at Conciliation Resources in the United Kingdom.

Muhammad Abbas Hassan

Muhammad Abbas Hassan is working as a research associate at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. He has previously taught at National Defence University and Bahria University, Islamabad. His research areas include the Middle East (West Asia), terrorism, and maritime security. He is a NATO certified trainer and a member at The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College, London and the World Institute for Nuclear Security, Vienna, Austria.

CONTENTS

Summary	3
Introduction	4
Gwadar Port	4
Chabahar Port	5
Sister Ports	6
Overview Pak-Iran Economic and Trade Relations	7
Impact of Saudi Investment	8
Conclusion	9
References.....	10

SUMMARY

- The geopolitical state of affairs in South Asia is rapidly changing.
- In terms of strategy and economic benefit, Gwadar holds great significance.
- Saudi Arabia's venture in Gwadar means that the Saudis would be directly concerned in Pakistan's economic affairs.
- Solidifying Saudi economic presence in Pakistan translates into intensified Saudi leverage over Pakistan.
- Notwithstanding their strong position against Iran, the US views Indian investment in Chabahar as a positive sign because it counters China.
- Both Gwadar and Chabahar complement each other and once functional could substantially boost regional trade. Moreover, it would open further economic prospects and countless job opportunities for the ever-growing population in the region.

Keywords: Gwadar, Chabahar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, China, India.

ÖZET

- Güney Asya'daki jeopolitik durum hızla değişmektedir.
- Gwadar Limanı strateji ve ekonomik fayda açısından büyük önem taşımaktadır.
- Suudi Arabistan'ın Gwadar'daki yatırımı Suudilerin Pakistan'ın ekonomik ilişkilerine doğrudan müdahil olacakları anlamına gelmektedir.
- Suudi Arabistan'ın Pakistan'daki ekonomik varlığının güçlenmesi, Suudilerin Pakistan üzerindeki kaldıraç gücünü artırmaktadır.
- ABD, İran karşıtı bakış açısına sahip olmasına rağmen Hindistan'ın Çabahar'daki yatırımı Çin'e karşı bir girişim olarak değerlendirdiği için olumlu bir gelişme olarak görmektedir.
- Gwadar ve Çabahar birbirini tamamlar ve faaliyete geçerse bölgesel ticareti önemli ölçüde artırabilir. Ayrıca bölgede sürekli artan nüfus için daha fazla ekonomik imkân ve sayısız iş fırsatı ortaya çıkarabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gwadar, Çabahar, Suudi Arabistan, İran, Pakistan, Çin, Hindistan.

چکیده

- اوضاع ژئوپلیتیک در جنوب آسیا به سرعت در حال تغییر است.
 - بندر گوادر از لحاظ استراتژیک و اقتصادی، حایز اهمیت فراوانی است.
 - سرمایه گذاری عربستان سعودی در گوادر به این معناست که سعودی ها به طور مستقیم در اقتصاد پاکستان مرتبط خواهند بود.
 - افزایش حضور اقتصادی عربستان سعودی در پاکستان باعث تقویت اهرمهای نفوذش در آن کشور می شود.
 - علیرغم موضع گیری شدید در برابر ایران، ایالات متحده آمریکا سرمایه گذاری هند در چابهار را در تقابل با چین یک گام مثبت می داند.
 - گوادر و چابهار همدیگر را تکمیل می کنند و در صورت اجرایی شدن می توانند تجارت منطقه ای را به میزان قابل توجهی افزایش دهند. همچنین می توانند امکانات بیشتر اقتصادی و فرصتهای شغلی بی شمار برای جمعیت روز افزون منطقه فراهم آورند.
- کلید واژه ها:** گوادر، چابهار، عربستان سعودی، ایران، پاکستان، چین، هند.



Introduction

The geopolitical state of affairs in South Asia is rapidly changing; a fact that is accredited to the role of emerging regional powers. Moreover, South Asia's proximity to the oil-rich Middle East has a significant influence on geopolitical developments. Contracts are being drawn and alliances befitting each countries' economic and political motives are being formed. Pakistan's pursuit to aid its economy by taking part in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is seen as a vital step in economic cooperation and regional connectivity. The \$62 billion overture, which is part of President Xi Jinping's wider Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), purports to expand China's sway in Pakistan and across Central and South Asia, as well as counter the US and Indian authority in the region. Furthermore, the initiative comprises infrastructure links such as rail, road, and oil production to promote congruence between China and the Middle East.

The ports of Gwadar and Chabahar have, per their capacities, fortified the alliance between Pakistan and China, and India and Iran. Furthermore, the two projects cause a precarious balance of regional power, which comes at a time that the US is abating its regional presence. Gwadar Port, which connects China's northwestern Xinjiang with the Arabian Sea, is the southern nucleus of the CPEC project. The deep-sea port, which was completed in 2007, provides China expeditious passage to both the Middle East and Africa. The Chabahar Port lies 72 km from the Gwadar Port, situated on the Makran coast of Iran's Sistan and Balochistan province. It is an Indian sponsored harbor with the potential to deluge Central Asian and Afghan markets with Indian goods. However, the struggle for regional authority could hamper streamlined global shipping and concurrently exacerbate prevailing antipathies. There has been much debate about whether Gwadar and Chabahar are rivals or counterparts.

Zeb (2003) argues that both port projects will continue stoking tensions between Pakistan and Iran, something disadvantageous to both countries. He goes on to say that it would be preferable if the countries find mutual ground and construct their respective ports in a complementary manner. Moreover, Daniels (2013) observes that one way to avoid escalating regional rivalry between Iran and Pakistan would be by a private sector initiated procedural code, which will ensure that each country has an equal, objective say in port operations. Khan (2013) has concluded that based on Iran's amicable relations with its neighbors, in terms of trade passage, Chabahar will be unvanquished in the port rivalry. While Roshan suggests that Gwadar Port has the capability to furnish Pakistan with strong economic status since its potential, in terms of trade, surpasses the infrastructure shortcomings of Chabahar (Tanoli & Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2017).

This paper will impart a brief overview of the Gwadar and Chabahar ports. It will discuss Pakistan-Iran economic relations in the last decade and what Saudi investment entails for the supposed rivalry between the two ports. In this regard, the article will answer the following question: How do Saudi investments affect the competition between Gwadar and Chabahar?

Gwadar Port

The Gwadar Port is a critical deep-sea port in the Balochistan province of southwestern Pakistan; 800 km from the Karachi Port. In 1958, after four years of negotiations, the Gwadar Port was purchased from Oman for three million dollars (Gwadar Port: Harbinger of Prosperity for Baloch People, 2015). One attribute of the port is its location at the crossway of the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. It is situated near the Strait of Hormuz, a salient route to the



oil generating region. However, due to climatic conditions, its distance from the political hub of Pakistan, and the economic centers of the existing ports, its development was disregarded by Pakistan's government. It was only in 1999, with the assistance of the Chinese authorities, that redevelopment of the port commenced.

In terms of strategy and economic benefit, Gwadar holds great significance. After the Karachi and Qasim ports, it is the third deep-sea port of the country. Furthermore, it can prospectively serve as an international trade hub linking South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Through Gwadar, Pakistan can foster partnerships with other countries in the energy spheres. Moreover, the port will augment foreign investment and increase the engagement of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) planned under the CPEC project. Furthermore, it would afford the Balochistan province much needed economic activity and, subsequently, ameliorate local employment opportunities and assist development in the country.

The first stage of the port development was completed by the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) at the end of 2005. Following this, after international bidding, the port operations contract was awarded to the Port of Singapore Authority Gwadar Pte Ltd. However, the company failed to adhere to its contract, and, therefore, the 'Concessional Rights' were eventually transferred to the China Overseas Port Holding Company in 2013 (Mahmood, 2018). As part of the CPEC arrangement, Pakistan ceded the construction of the Gwadar Port to China, which is linked by road to the Chinese city of Kashghar. Gwadar is 2,800 km from Kashghar, while the Port of Shanghai is 4,500 km. The port would allow the Chinese access to Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). If the Strait of Malacca were blocked by India or the US, Gwadar could act as an alternative sea route. It can also serve as a

replacement route to the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Regarding oil demand, China ranks the top country in the world. Oil transport from the Gulf of Oman to China requires around three months, however, by transporting oil via Gwadar, time will be saved and safe passage will be ensured. An additional advantage is that continual transport of oil is guaranteed, excluding weather conditions.

It is envisaged that Gwadar Port will not only manage Chinese trade to the Gulf States but also countries in Africa and Europe. Since 1993, China has been the world's largest purchaser of electricity as it consumes nearly 25 percent of global output; the Gulf States are China's largest market for hydrocarbon. Furthermore, by the year 2020, China is expected to become the Gulf countries' largest trading partner, with Beijing importing \$160 billion and exporting \$135 billion. Given this, by the year 2025, it is predicted that Gwadar Port will be supporting much of the oceanic commerce. As of 2018, Saudi Arabia is China's largest oil trading partner, providing more than 15 percent of annual oil import (Musvver, 2016). In view of the strong reliance on Pakistan in the near future, Gulf countries have been keen to invest in the Gwadar Port. During Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman's visit in February 2019, Aramco, which has been re-orienting its strategies to achieve a comprehensive, multi-faceted plan for growth, proposed a \$10 billion refinery, as well as a petrochemical complex, in Gwadar. In addition to providing thousands of employment opportunities, this investment will help Pakistan reduce its oil imports by \$3 billion per year.

Chabahar Port

Iran initiated work on the Chabahar Port back in 2007. Currently, the cargo capacity of the port is almost 8.5 million tons. However, the port can accommodate up to 100,000-ton



ships (Daniels, 2013). When Iran and India signed an agreement, which entrusted India with operational control of the port, prosperity and connectivity were the catchwords. In 2016, India agreed to establish two terminals with five berths at the Shahid Beheshti area in Chabahar. Later, out of the 15 MoUs, which were signed between the countries in 2018, nine focused on the Chabahar Port (Hassan, 2016). Subsequently, the Chabahar Port, located in the Gulf of Oman, is being developed by India as a transportation channel, which will also be of great benefit to landlocked Afghanistan. Moreover, Chabahar Port will act as the commencing point for the International North-South Trade Corridor (INTSC) that proposes to connect India, Iran, Russia, and several Central Asian states. Due to the decades-long conflict between India and Pakistan, Delhi faced impediments in establishing a passage to access the markets in Iran, Afghanistan, and the CARs. However, the development of Chabahar will be a footbridge to limitless trading opportunities for India, Iran, and Afghanistan with the CARs.

India has devoted approximately \$2 billion to the port project, \$500 million has been assigned to the edifice of the port and \$1.6 billion has been allotted for the establishment of a rail link that will connect the port to the Iranian city of Zahedan, which borders Afghanistan. According to the MoUs, India is responsible for building a 600 m cargo terminal, as well as a 640 m container terminal. Declining relations between Washington and Tehran had temporarily halted construction. Nevertheless, in December 2018, when India assumed control of a portion of the Shahid Beheshti Port, work resumed.

Notwithstanding its strong position against Iran, the US perceives Indian investment in Chabahar as a positive sign, as it counters China. This is exhibited in the statement by former United States Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson when he affirmed that as long as India's interest

in Iran poses no threat to the US, the latter is not concerned with Indian investment in Chabahar. It is worth mentioning that there are multiple interests involved in the development of the Chabahar Port. Firstly, it allows India to completely bypass Pakistan. Secondly, the port serves as a transit corridor between India and Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Moreover, by investing in Chabahar, India aspires to diminish Chinese influence in the region. In fact, Chinese investment in CPEC provides India with economic justification to invest in Chabahar.

Sister Ports

Though at close proximity, the Gwadar Port has superiority over Chabahar when it comes to geographical placement and utility. However, Chabahar has better infrastructure connection facilities to chief transportation points in Central Asia and Europe. The concept of the complementary ports is that Iran is conscious that Gwadar Port is more prodigious and can attract more traffic, although, if Gwadar port is encumbered, it can divert some traffic to Chabahar Port and vice versa. Hence, they holistically complement each other. Realistically speaking, Gwadar's natural depth enables it to dock large ships. On the other hand, Chabahar has a planned maximum capacity of 10-12 million tons per annum while Gwadar's capacity will be 300-400 million tons. If all goes as forecast, at full capacity Gwadar has the ability to surpass India's 212 ports that accumulatively handle 500 million tons a year.

India has regarded Gwadar Port in competition with Chabahar, a view primarily in place because it interprets cooperation between Pakistan and China as a threat to its regional dominance. However, the opinions from the Iranian camp are divergent. At the inauguration of the Chabahar Port, President Rouhani played



down the port rivalry by stating that both ports would bring “more engagement and unity” to the region (Siddiqui, 2017). Furthermore, Iran deems the development of Gwadar in congruence with the development of Pakistan’s Makran region. In recent years, Iran has been implementing development programs for the Makran coast. To support its stance, Iran has funded the export of electricity to Gwadar Port. To further promulgate that the two ports are compatible, the Ambassador of Iran to Pakistan, Mr. Mehdi Honardoost stated that “Iran and Pakistan have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of sister ports for further convergence of the Chabahar and Gwadar ports” (Chabahar Port, 2017).

Moreover, the trade relation between Pakistan and China varies from that of India and Iran. While Pakistan requires Chinese investment to survive, Iran, despite the deleterious effects of the US sanctions, will not give India enough space to pursue its interests at the cost of Iranian concerns. Furthermore, Gwadar can provide Iran the prospect to further its ties with China, which has traditionally been Iran’s greatest trading partner. In the first half of 2017, bilateral trade between Beijing and Tehran grew by 31 percent compared to the previous year. According to reports, China’s exports to Iran witnessed a 23 percent increase, rising to \$8.8 billion, while Iran’s exports to China rose from \$6.5 billion to \$9.2 billion in the same period (Rezaei, 2019). Hence, both countries would be willing to extend upon this positive trajectory. At the same time, Pakistan can garner greater market access through the Chabahar Port.

Overview of Pak-Iran Economic and Trade Relations

Iran and Islamabad economic relations have never approached their true potential. One reason is the US sanctions on Iran. Another reason may

be attributed to Pakistan’s close association with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. According to the State Bank of Pakistan, Pak-Iran trade was at an all-time low in 2018; Pakistan imports amounted to just \$59,000 worth of goods in the first 10 months of the year (BR Research, 2018). A trust deficit lingers between the two countries where the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline is concerned. Even though Iran completed its part in 2011, Pakistan has yet to finish its end of the project. Unlike India, Pakistan was not able to garner a waiver for US sanctions on Iran, which severely hindered its construction. Subsequently, in 2018, Iran demanded that Pakistan pay \$1.2 billion as retribution for not completing its share of the project, even threatening to take Pakistan to the International Court of Arbitration (Mustafa, 2018).

Under the platform of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), both countries have attempted to mitigate the deficiencies in their relationship. Initiatives such as the Economic Cooperation Organization Trade Agreement (ECOTA) and the ECO Trade and Development Bank aim at minimizing the credibility gap between the two countries. In 2006, they signed a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) to cultivate bilateral trade and work towards employing opportunities (Pak-Iran Preferential Trade Agreement, 2005). In 2009, when the US applied the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, Iran-Pakistan trade suffered negative repercussions. While in 2008-2009, trade between the two countries amounted to \$1.32 billion, it plummeted to \$0.73 billion in the period 2010-2011 (Aftab, 2013). Although, following the 2015 nuclear deal, trade volume between the two countries again crossed \$1 billion (Pakistan Product exports and imports from Iran, Islamic Rep, 2015). In the same year, during the seventh Pakistan-Iran Joint Trade Committee, the two countries agreed to commit to a five-year trade assistance plan to bolster



trade volume up to \$5 billion. Major Pakistani exports to Iran include rice, fruits, vegetables, and textiles, while major import products from Iran include mineral fuels, chemicals, iron, steel, and fertilizers.

Furthermore, Iranian officials have voiced that the barter system may be introduced to stimulate trade. Pakistan's dairy sector potential can be proliferated by Iran's experience in the same sector. However, for any trade to be increased, the banking system between the two countries must be reinforced. For Iran, Pakistan and the CPEC project provide avenues for connectivity, which will support export on both sides. Moreover, if the Gwadar and Chabahar ports are fully developed they could raise trade volume to the \$5 billion target.

Impact of Saudi Investment

In early 2019, Saudi Energy Minister Khalid Al-Falih visited Pakistan and the projected site for the oil refinery in Gwadar (Dawn, 2019). The intended refinery would serve as a port for storing oil imported from the Middle East, as well as a means of meeting the oil requirements of not only Pakistan but also of China and the CARs. A refinery in Gwadar, the nucleus of the CPEC project, would automatically connect the Saudis with the BRI. During bin Salman's visit in February 2019, the memorandum to establish the refinery was made definite. However, Saudi investment in South Asian countries is not a new phenomenon. In 2018, Saudi Aramco heralded investment worth \$44 billion in an oil refinery in India (Gulf News, 2018). Despite past Saudi aid to Pakistan during financial woes, such as free oil imports in the 1990s, this investment is a first. The Kingdom's venture in Gwadar means that the Saudis would be directly concerned in Pakistan's economic affairs.

Indubitably, Riyadh will be enraptured that it now has a chance to extend its influence in

Pakistan and by extension, have an eagle's eye on its decades-long adversary, Iran, since the refinery will be a mere 45 miles from the Iranian border. The border area is already affected by Baloch insurgent groups, in which Tehran has inculpated Riyadh for funding. The inherent risks became evident when on October 16th, 14 Iranian guards on the Pakistan border were kidnapped by Sunni militants that were active in the area. In December 2018, 4 policemen and 42 civilians were injured by a car explosion in Chabahar. Sunni Baloch militants took liability for the incident (Al Jazeera, 2018). In February 2019, a suicide bomber took the lives of 27 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps for which Jaish al-Adl, another Sunni Baloch group, claimed responsibility (Erdbrink, 2019). When work on the refinery in Gwadar gets underway, either side of the Pak-Iran border may be more prone to attacks. Moreover, any Saudi footprint near the Pak-Iran border could fuel outbreaks in the Sistan-Balochistan province and subsequent backlash on the Pakistani side.

Solidifying Saudi economic presence in Pakistan translates into intensified Saudi leverage over Pakistan. Riyadh can potentially summon Pakistani military support. While Pakistan refused to back the battle in Yemen in 2015, an ailing economy and financial dearth present a different scenario for Islamabad. It is important to mention that in the war in Yemen, the Saudi coalition fight against the Houthi rebels is, in essence, a proxy war against Iran. With comments such as calling out Iran as the "chief sponsor of terrorism," barring any fragment of Iranian hegemony is Riyadh's utmost priority. While Saudi investment forebodes Middle East proxy wars infiltrating Pakistan's shores, another plausible consequence for Pakistan is the further pushing of Iran towards India, which are already experiencing bilateral ties with an upward trajectory. Hence, Saudi investment in



Gwadar does not directly affect the Gwadar and Chabahar debate because the two ports cater to different markets and are complementary, although, Saudi investment may indirectly provoke rivalries on either side and inhibit the two ports from reaching their full potential.

Conclusion

At the 13th ECO Summit, President Hassan Rouhani, while calling for the restructuring of the ECO, said that “Connectivity will help development and prosperity in the region” (Anadolu Agency, 2017). It is, therefore, paramount that both Pakistan and Iran quash their differences, look at the bigger picture, and improve upon the economic avenues between both countries. A first step can be continuing to work on the IP project, once known as the ‘Peace Pipeline.’ Its completion would help address the energy deficits in Pakistan. Moreover, it is essential for Pakistan’s energy security. Both Gwadar and Chabahar complement each other and, once functional, could copiously facilitate regional trade. Furthermore, it would open additional economic prospects and numerous job opportunities for the ever-growing population in the region.

While Saudi investment in Pakistan has been lauded and viewed as a life jacket for the financially drowning economy, Pakistan needs to be cognizant that geography entails that neighbors cannot be changed. Rather than help Pakistan’s ailing economy, the tensions caused by the Saudi investment, with respect to Iran, could prove detrimental for Pakistan, not only in terms of bilateral relations but also by jeopardizing the CPEC project. Pakistan-Iran ties have been strained for some time. However, with the advent of a new government in Pakistan, Iran has taken active steps to assure the relationship develops smoothly by sending their Foreign Minister to visit the new Prime Minister. No doubt that the Saudi investment is what Pakistan needed to bring some stability to its economy, but, at the same time, Islamabad should tread carefully to prevent its relations with Tehran from succumbing to the Saudi-Iranian rivalry.

Hence, by overcoming all obstacles that threaten their security, both Iran and Pakistan should swiftly cooperate, collaborate, and unite on all fronts. Even though motives may change, the bonds of brotherhood, cooperation, and economic survival safeguard that the underlying objective of economic development is mutual.



References

- Aftab, S. (2012). "Country Brief on IRAN". TDAP Report on Iran. Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/38DjyBy> [Accessed: 18.09.2019]
- Al Jazeera. Iran: Suicide attack hits police post in Chabahar. Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/2VZsMWf> [Accessed: 11.09.2019]
- Anadolu Agency. Erdogan in Pakistan urges closer ties among ECO states. Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/2vKNPRO> [Accessed: 02.10.2019]
- BR Research. (2018). Pakistan-Iran trade discrepancies. Business Recorder. Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/39D2soI> [Accessed: 09.09.2019]
- Daniels, R. (2013). Strategic competition in South Asia: Gwadar, Chabahar, and the risks of infrastructure development. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 35(2), 93-100.
- Dawn. Saudi minister visits Gwadar to inspect construction site of proposed oil refinery. Retrieved at <https://www.dawn.com/news/1457118> [Accessed: 13.09.2019]
- Diplomatic News Agency. (2017). "Chabahar Port inauguration, new opportunity for enhancing regional collaborations: Iran envoy." Islamic Republic News Agency. Retrieved at <http://www.irna.ir/en/News/82755697> [Accessed: 24.09.2019]
- Erdbrink, T. (2019). "Iran Suicide Bombing Kills 27 Revolutionary Guards". *The New York Times*. Retrieved at <https://nyti.ms/3cOkGFF> [Accessed: 13.09.2019]
- Erdbrink, T. "Iran Suicide Bombing Kills 27 Revolutionary Guards." *The New York Times*. Retrieved at <https://nyti.ms/2IEekuE> [Accessed: 09.09.2019]
- Gulf News. Saudi Aramco to invest \$44b in giant India oil refinery. Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/2xiUqmD> [Accessed: 03.09.2019]
- Hassan M.A. (2018). "Indian Access to Chabahar And Duqm: Challenges For Pakistan." Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/2v9ISma> [Accessed: 10.09.2019]
- Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. (2018). Book Launch "Gwadar: Balance in Transition. Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/2IyYUbf> [Accessed: 29.09.2019]
- Khan, Z.A. (2013). China's Gwadar and India's Chabahar: an analysis of Sino-India geo-strategic and economic competition. *Strategic Studies*, 32(4-1).
- Mustafa, K. "Shelving of IP gas project: Iran threatens to take Pakistan to The Hague." *The News*. Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/39Qg5RP> [Accessed: 07.09.2019]
- Musvver, A. (2016). China's Trade Relations with Saudi Arabia: Performance and Prospects. *International Affairs and Global Strategy*. Vol.43.
- Pak-Iran Preferential Trade Agreement. Ministry of Commerce, Pakistan. Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/3cFjCnA> [Accessed: 17.09.2019]
- Pakistan Product exports and imports from Iran, Islamic Rep. 2015. *World Integrated Trade Solution*. Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/2TEuNFz> [Accessed: 01.09.2019]



- Rezaei, F. (2019). “Will America Force Iran to Strengthen Ties with China and Russia?” *The National Interest*. Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/39D3xNi> [Accessed: 26.09.2019]
- Rezaei, F. (2019). Will America Force Iran to Strengthen Ties with China and Russia?. *The National Interest*. Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/2W2RyVk> [Accessed: 04.09.2019]
- Siddiqui, S. (2017). Comparing Gwadar and Chabahar Ports: Rivals or ‘sisters’? Opinion. *Asia Times*.
- Tanoli, J. R. (2016). Comparative Analysis of Gwadar and Chabahar: The Two Rival Ports. *Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research*, 2-3.
- The News. (2015). Gwadar Port: Harbinger of prosperity for Baloch people. Retrieved at <https://bit.ly/2TMAT5y> [Accessed: 19.09.2019]
- Zeb, R. (2003). Gwadar And Chabahar: Competition Or Complimentarity?. *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*.



“Tanıtım nüshasıdır, para ile satılamaz.”
“Bandrol Uygulamasına İlişkin Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmeliğin 5’inci maddesinin
2’nci fıkrası çerçevesinde bandrol taşıması zorunlu değildir.”

About İRAM

Center for Iranian Studies in Ankara is a non-profit research center dedicated to promoting innovative research and ideas on Iranian affairs. Our mission is to conduct in-depth research to produce up-to-date and accurate knowledge about Iran's politics, economy and society. İRAM's research agenda is guided by three key principles – factuality, quality and responsibility.



Center for Iranian Studies in Ankara

Oğuzlar Mh. 1397. Sk. No: 14 06520 Çankaya, Balgat, Ankara, Turkey
Phone: +90 312 284 55 02 - 03 Fax: +90 312 284 55 04
e-mail: info@iramcenter.org www.iramcenter.org

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted without the prior written permission of İRAM.