

THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION BEHIND THE CURTAIN: THE MADKHALI SALAFISTS

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The Terrorist Organization behind the Curtain: The Madkhali Salafists

Perde Arkasındaki Terör Örgütü: Medhali Selefiler

سازمان تروریستی پشت پرده: سلفیهای مدخلی

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SUMMARY

- While Islamic movements and sects can play a constructive role in maintaining the security of a country, they can also have major roles in causing social conflicts.
- Madkhali Salafism, which targets Islamic personalities and sects, is a problem that grows day by day. With the support of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, it poses a threat to Islamic countries', especially to Libya's stability.
- Refuting their arguments and deciphering their mission would help neutralize the threat posed by the Madkhali Salafists, who are armed and employed in various crisis zones to tilt the balance of power.
- First employed by Saudi Arabia against the Al-Sahwa Movement and later expanded for further use, the Madkhali Salafists have become a military organization, as seen in Yemen and Libya.
- If the Madkhali Salafists, who have turned into another version of the DAESH/ISIS, cannot be restrained in the near future, they will very likely continue to fight in others areas of conflict, under the fatwa's issued by Saudi Arabia.

Keywords: Salafists, Madkhali Salafism, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the es-Sahve Movement, Yemen

ÖZET

- İslami akımlar ve cemaatler, ülkelerin güvenlik ve istikrarında yapıcı bir rol oynadıkları gibi tam tersine toplumsal çatışmaların aktörleri ve tetikleyicileri olarak da karşımıza çıkabilmektedir.
- İslami şahsiyetleri ve cemaatleri hedef alan Medhali Selefilik, Suudi Arabistan ve Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri gibi devletlerin desteğiyle her geçen gün büyüyen bir sorun olarak İslam ülkelerinin ve özellikle de Libya'nın istikrarı için tehdit teşkil etmektedir.
- Kriz bölgelerinde dengeleri değiştirmek amacıyla silahlandırılıp sahaya sürülen Medhali Selefilerin üstlendikleri misyonun deşifre edilmesi ve argümanlarının çürütülmesi söz konusu tehdidin etkisiz hâle getirilmesine katkıda bulunacaktır.
- Suudi Arabistan'ın es-Sahve akımına karşı kullanmak üzere ürettiği ve daha sonra kullanım alanını genişlettiği Medhali Selefiler, Yemen ve Libya örneklerinde görüldüğü gibi silahlı bir örgüte dönüşmüştür.
- DEAS'ın bir başka versiyonuna dönüşen Medhali Selefiler, önümüzdeki süreçte dizginlenemezse büyük ihtimalle daha başka çatışma alanlarında da Suudi Arabistan'dan gelen fetvalar doğrultusunda savaşmaya devam edecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Selefiler, Medhali Selefilik, Suudi Arabistan, Libya, es-Sahve Akımı, Yemen

چکیده

- گروه‌ها و جریانهای اسلامی همانگونه که می‌توانند نقشی سازنده در ثبات و امنیت کشورها ایفا کنند، می‌توانند عامل و مسبب درگیریهای اجتماعی نیز باشند.
 - جریان سلفی مدخلی که شخصیتها و جوامع اسلامی را هدف قرار می‌دهد، با حمایت کشورهایی مانند عربستان سعودی و امارات متحده عربی ثبات کشورهای اسلامی و به ویژه لیبی را به طور فزاینده مورد تهدید قرار می‌دهد.
 - رمزگشایی از مأموریت سلفی های مدخلی که برای تغییر معادلات در مناطق بحرانی مسلح و مستقر شده اند، و همچنین رد مستدل دلایل آنها، به خنثی کردن تهدیدشان کمک می‌کند.
 - عربستان سعودی سلفی های مدخلی را برای استفاده علیه جنبش صحوه (بیداری) به وجود آورد و همانطور که در یمن و لیبی دیده می‌شود، بعدها زمینه های استفاده از این گروه را بسط داده و آن را به یک سازمان مسلح تبدیل کرده است.
 - چنانچه سلفی های مدخلی که به نسخه دیگری از داعش تبدیل شده اند، در دوره پیش رو مهار نشوند، احتمالاً با صدور فتواها از عربستان سعودی شاهد حضور آنها در دیگر مناطق درگیری خواهیم بود.
- کلیدواژه‌ها:** سلفی‌ها، جریان سلفی مدخلی، عربستان سعودی، لیبی، یمن، جنبش صحوه (بیداری).



Introduction

Since the birth of Islam, Islamic movements and sects have had an impact on social and political developments as well as on religious life in Muslim societies. Although this impact is in both positive and sometimes negative ways, it constitutes an important place in the relations of religion and politics. As Islamic movements and sects play a constructive role in the security and stability of countries; on the contrary, they can appear as actors and triggers of social conflicts as well. For this reason, it requires a deeper research of thought codes and discourses of Islamic movements and sects, their relations with society and the state, and their in-depth effects on social life and politics.

Salafism is one of the movements that shape the social and belief structure of the Islamic geography. Many studies have been conducted on Salafism, due to the terrorist organizations such as: Al-Qaeda and DAESH, which are seen in conflict zones and the Nur Party, which supported the military coup that overthrew Mohamed Morsi in Egypt. The Madkhalis, who were among the forces loyal to the putschist Khalifa Haftar, who fought to overthrow the Government of National Accord (GNA), which is accepted as the legitimate representative of Libya by the international community, are among the Salafi movements and for a better understanding of the role they play, the detailed studies of the Madkhali Salafism are needed which goes beyond the general Salafism studies. These detailed studies will help to avoid false generalizations that cause differences to be ignored and will lay the groundwork for more accurate analysis.

In this study, the birth and purpose of Madkhali Salafism, its view on administration, its approach to Islamic figures and sects are discussed. In this study, the relationship between Madkhali Salafism and Saudi Arabia, the emergence of the movement in Libya and its transformation into an organization that engaged in armed activities were also examined.

1. Salafism

One of the influential movements of the former and the present in the Islamic world is the Salafism / Salafiyya movement. It is derived from the term “salaf”, which is used for the ashâb and tâbiîn, who are considered the leaders of the Muslims in terms of knowledge and virtue (Özervarlı, 2009, p. 399). The word “salaf” means “pioneer / past”. The expression “someone has a precious predecessor” means “they have valuable past ancestors” (Al-Isfahani, 2012).

The followers of the Salafist School argue that Islam is understood by the best ashâb, tâbiîn and etbâû’t-tâbiîn, and the given three generations should be taken as an example, and they attribute the superiority of these three generations described as “salaf al-salihin” to the following hadith: “The best of people are those of my age (my ashâb). Then the ones that come from them (tâbiîn) and then the ones that come after them (etbâû’t-tâbiîn).” (Bukhari, Shahâdât, 9). They use the name “Salafi” to show that they follow in the footsteps of “salaf-i salihin”. The Salafist School today has a wide variety of factions, from violent to those who adopt the democratic regime and carry out party activities. Although there are common aspects of religious move-



ments known as classical Salafism, Jihadist Salafism, Al-Sahwa, al-Jam'iyya and Madkhali Salafism, there are also important differences of thought and beliefs among them.

2. Madkhali Salafism

Al-Jam'iyya, one of the Salafi movements, was named after Muḥammad Amān ibn 'Alī Jāmī (1930-1995), who was known for his criticism of scholars who said that it is not permissible to ask for help from America to save Kuwait from the occupation. 'Alī Jāmī, who immigrated to Saudi Arabia, worked as a lecturer at the Islamic University in the city of Medina and gave lectures on the principles of the Islamic belief both at the university and in the Masjid an-Nabawi¹.

The birth of Al-Jam'iyya coincides with Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the days after the Gulf War (Gazzal, 2016). In those days, Muḥammad Amān ibn 'Alī Jāmī argued that it was permissible to ask for help from America and entered into a relentless struggle against the Al-Sahwa movement, which was represented by names, such as: Salman al-Awde and Sefer al-Havali, who argued that it was not permissible to ask for help from the United States in order to send the Iraqi army away from Kuwait. This output of 'Alī Jāmī was also supported by the Riyadh administration. Moreover, it is widely believed that 'Alī Jāmī was driven into the field by the Saudi Arabian Minister of Interior Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz against the Al-Sahwa movement. Therefore, it can be said that Al-Jam'iyya is a fabricated trend produced by the Saudi Arabian intelligence.

Saudi Arabia's intelligence increased its support of Al-Jam'iyya, and Al-Jam'iyya has also been used by other dictatorial regimes against Islamic movements and sects, when it was seen that Al-Jam'iyya was a useful tool, that targeted the Al-Sahwa movement, which was accused of being influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and being "sectarian" (Abu Heniyye, 2019). One of them is the Gaddafi regime (Sasa Post, 2019)². In this process, the target audience that started with the Salafi Al-Sahwa movement expanded to the Jihadist Salafis, Tablighi Jamaat and Muslim Brotherhood Community.

Rabee al-Madkhali is the second leading name of the Al-Jam'iyya movement after Muḥammad Amān ibn 'Alī Jāmī. Al-Madkhali, who was born in 1932 in the Jizan region, the south of Saudi Arabia, is still alive and resides in Al Madinah Al Munawwarah. Rabee al-Madkhali, who graduated from the Faculty of Sharia at the Islamic University in Medina, worked at the same university and taught hadith lessons (Al Jazeera, 2018). Rabee al-Madkhali became the leader of a new sect called "Madkhali Salafis" due to his harsh attitude towards the people and sects targeted by the Salafi Al-Jam'iyya movement, his origins from Saudi Arabia unlike the Ethiopian-born Muḥammad Amān ibn 'Alī Jāmī, his leadership at Al-Jam'iyya as its most important name after the death of Alī Jāmī in 1995, his establishment of relations with Al-Jam'iyya's followers/adepts in a religious order and declaration of him "Allāme" by those followers.

2.1. Hostility towards Islamic Sects

Believing that the Al-Sahwa movement, which is widespread in Saudi Arabia was influ-

¹ For the short life story of Muḥammad Amān ibn 'Alī Jāmī see. (Ajurru)

² See also (al-Medveli, 2020)



enced by the Muslim Brotherhood and names such as: Sayyid Qutb, Al-Jam'iyya wrote many books, especially targeting Sayyid Qutb. The following books which are written by Rabee al-Madkhali, all aim to discredit Sayyid Qutb: *Mataini Sayyid Qutb fi Ashabi Rasulillahi* (s) (Spots where Sayyid Qutb defamed Ashabs of the Prophet), *Adwaun Islamiyyetun alâ Aqideti Sayyid Qutb and Fikrihi* (Islamic Lights to Sayyid Qutb's Aqidah and Idea), *Nazrati Sayyid Qutub ila Ashabi Rasulillah* (s) (Sayyid Qutb's View on the Prophet's Ashabs), *Nazarat fi Kitab-i't-Tasviri'l-Fennifi'l-Qur'anic-Kerim li Sayyid Qutb* (Sayyid Qutb's Overview to the Book of Depictions in Qur'an), *al-Avasim mimma fi Kutubi Sayyid Qutb mine'l-Kavasim* (Protection from Destructive Things in Sayyid Qutb's Books), *al-Haddu'l-Fasil beyna'l-Hakki wa'l-Batil* (The Border Between Truth and Superstition), and *Yenbuu'l-Fiten ve'l-Ahdas ellezi Yenbeği li'l-Ummeti Ma'rifetuhu summe Radmuhi* (The Spring of Fitna and Events to be Recognized by the Ummah and then Closed).

It is clear that Rabee al-Madkhali did not write these books for scientific criticism. As a matter of fact, after the book *Mataini Sayyid Qutb fi Ashabi Rasulillahi* (s) was finished, he sent it to one of the leading scholars of Saudi Arabia, Bakr Abu Zayd to write the introduction and recommendations. However, Bakr Abu Zayd refused to write the introduction and recommendations for the book of Rabee al-Madkhali and wrote a long letter composed of several pages and severely criticized al-Madkhali's book (Hayr Musa, 2019)³. The names targeted by the Al-Jam'iyya movement, including the Mad-

khali Salafists, are not limited to Sayyid Qutb. Hasan al-Banna, Muhammed Qutb, Abu'l-Hasan Al-Nadvi, Muhammed Al-Ghazali, Hasan Tura-bi, Yusuf al-Karadavi and many others are also on the enemy list of Al-Jam'iyya.

2.2. Excessive Obedience to the Authority

The most important feature of the Salafi Al-Jam'iyya movement is its extreme views on obedience to the ulu'l-amr (authority) as well as targeting the Islamic communities and personalities. They go so far in this regard that they literally sanctify the rulers. They claim that the ulu'l-amr cannot be criticized in any way. Abdulaziz Ar-Riys from Saudi Arabia, one of the prominent names of the Madkhali Salafists, stated that the ulu'l-amr, the ruler, even if he committed adultery and drank alcohol for half an hour every day on the live stream on the official television channel, he could not be criticized; on the contrary, instead he should be loved and obeyed by all the people (Arabi 21, 2018). Although it goes as far as to sanctify the rulers towards obeying the ulu'l-amr, it is observed that Al-Jam'iyya does not necessarily follow this rule unexceptionally. For example, it supported the military coup against the legitimate President Mohamed Morsi, who was elected by majority of votes in Egypt. Again, in Libya, it does not support the GNA led by Fayeze al-Sarraj, which is accepted as the legitimate government by the international community, but supports the putchist war baron Khalifa Haftar. However, they should support the GNA and Morsi according to their own criteria and accept Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Haftar as "Khar-ijites". This situation shows us that when determining the ruler who is obliged to be obeyed,

³ Rebi al-Medhali's For these books, see <https://www.rabee.net/ar/books.php>



Al-Jam'iyya observes Saudi Arabia's directives and acts arbitrarily rather than principally.

One of the contradictions of the Salafist Al-Jam'iyya is its attitude towards the Shiites and Iran. While Turkey and Qatar are accused by the Al-Jam'iyya for maintaining close relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia's closest ally, the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) friendship with Iran is being ignored. Also, while they shared and criticized the photos of the Turkish and Qatari officials' meetings with the Iranian officials, they did not make any kind of remarks towards the previous king of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, who welcomed the Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad in Mecca and sat beside him. Likewise, when it comes to names such as: the Yemeni Sufi al-Habib Ali al-Jifri and the Chechnya President Ramazan Kadirov, who supported the Egyptian Coup and whose activities are supported and financed by the UAE, they also forget the criticism of the Sufis and the bid'ahs.

Another feature of the Madkhali Salafis and Al-Jam'iyya is that they see themselves as "true Salafists" and "true ahlu Sunnah groups". Therefore, the emphasis on Salafism in their literature is more intense than that of other Salafist movements. They also see Rabee al-Madkhali as the greatest hadith scholar of this age. The reason why they take refuge behind the concepts such as: ahlu Sunnah, hadiths, and similar concepts stems from the need to hide their contrary thoughts and heresy. For instance, the Saudi Arabian Osama Al-Otaybi, one of the leading names of the Madkhali Salafists, claims that fighting in Libya with the mercenaries of the Russian security company Wagner under the

command of the putschist warlord Khalif Haftar will glorify the people's sunnah and weaken the people's bid'ah⁴.

One of the methods used by the Salafi Al-Jam'iyya movement to deceive people is that they portray loved and respected scholars as if they were in their ranks, thus gaining legitimacy for their deviant views and trying to deceive the enthusiasts of these scholars. The leader of these scholars is the hadith scholar of Albanian origin, Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albanī. However, al-Albanī thinks differently on the issues that are considered the hallmarks of Madkhali Salafists. For example, Madkhali Salafists regard Sayyid Qutb as an unbeliever and his books as dangerous. Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albanī, on the other hand, uses the expression "al-masterz al-kabir" (great master) for Sayyid Qutb in the preliminary of his work named: Muhtasaru'l-Ulūv, in which he summarizes the book called: Ulūv by Zehebi, and praised him and wrote the book "Unique Qur'anic Generation" (Al-Albani, 1981). The hadith scholar of Albanian origin has also the opinion that it is not permissible for Saudi Arabia to seek help from the United States to drive Saddam out of Kuwait and to deploy the American soldiers, whom he describes as "crusaders," in Saudi Arabia⁵.

2.3. Opposition towards the Arab Spring

The Madkhali Salafists and Al-Jam'iyya are also against the demonstrations organized by the Arab Spring and the Arab peoples to protest the dictatorial regimes. There are two reasons

⁴ For the sound recording of Osama al-Uteybi's fatwa for the given question, see (Youtube, 2020b)

⁵ Albanian hadith scholars have asked him questions on this issue. Expresses his opinion clearly in his answers. See (Al-Albany)



for this opposition. The first is their extreme views towards obedience to the *ulu'l-amr*. The second is that the Arab Spring revolutions shook Saudi Arabia's allies and toppled some of them, and the winds of revolution reached the Gulf countries. In an article published on the website in February 2011, Rabee al-Madkhali criticized the protests carried out for demanding democracy and described these demonstrations as "opposing the *ulu'l-amr* (the supreme order)" (al-Madkhali, 2011).

After Mohammed bin Salman became the Crown Prince, a witch hunt against the Al-Sahwa movement and the Brotherhood of Saudi Arabia was commenced at schools, universities, and official institutions in Saudi Arabia. While the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in an interview to the American channel CBS in 2018, that the idea of the Muslim Brotherhood Community, which he described as a "terrorist organization", invaded the education system in Saudi Arabia and that they will eradicate the idea, the Saudi Arabia Education Minister Ahmed bin Mohammed al-Isa also stated that the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on educational institutions in Saudi Arabia is undisputed (Moe.gov, 2018)⁶. Members of Al-Jam'iyya were appointed to replace those who were dismissed for allegedly carrying the thoughts of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Al-Sahwa movement, and this further increased the influence of Al-Jam'iyya in the country. The appointment of Abdullatif Al ash-Sheikh, one of the most notorious advocates of Al-Jam'iyya, to replace Salih bin Abdulaziz Al ash-Sheikh, who was accused of not being critical towards the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foundations and the Islamic Affairs, the Muslim Brotherhood Community and its members, aims to strengthen the view of Madkhali Salafism and

Al-Jam'iyya among the Ministry staff through removing supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Sahwa from the office⁷.

2.4. Transformation from Soft Power to Hard Power

The Salafist Al-Jam'iyya movement and the Madkhali Salafists operate its activities also in the countries other than Saudi Arabia as for the Gulf countries of: Kuwait, UAE and Bahrain; in Egypt, Yemen and Jordan; in North African countries such as: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and in many other Arab and Islamic countries, even in America and European countries where Islamic minorities live. It is noteworthy that the Madkhali Salafis, financed by Saudi Arabia and are employed/utilized as a "soft power", are used as military power in Libya and Yemen. The inclusion into the equation of hard power in Yemen and Libya of Al-Jam'iyya and the Madkhali Salafists, which in Egypt had appeared in the form of the pro-coup Nur Party has taken the danger to another dimension.

It is seen that Hani bin Brek, one of the important names of the Madkhali Salafis in Yemen, left his clergy and became the commander of the militia force. Hani bin Brek, who maintains close ties with the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, serves as the Vice president of the Southern Transition Council, which holds control of Aden and fights for the separation of South Yemen from Yemen. Hani bin Brek, who founded the militia with the weapons and financial support of the UAE, is accused of assassinating 30 Islamic invitees in Aden⁸. Since 2015, when Aden came under the control of UAE-backed forces, 103 assassinations were

⁶ Ukaz newspaper published in Saudi Arabia also stated that a war was waged against the idea of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabian schools and universities. (Hadramout, 2018)

⁷ For the news report of the 7. al-Arabi al-Jadid newspaper on the subject, see (Al-Araby, 2018).

⁸ The information that Hani bin Brek was involved in the assassinations is based on official reports. (See Al Jazeera, 2019)



carried out targeting police officers, mosque imams and political figures (AA, 2019).

3. Support to Salafism and the Haftar in Libya

In Libya, the Madkhali Salafists are fighting in the ranks of the warlord Khalifa Haftar, who fought to overthrow the legitimate government in Tripoli. Rabee al-Madkhali invited the the Libyan Salafists to stay away from strife and fight under the command of Khalifa Haftar⁹ (Thenewkhalij, 2019). Not considering whether Rabee al-Madkhali asked Libyans to fight under Haftar's command or not, it is an indisputable fact that his supporters in Libya were fighting under the command of the putschist general. The activities of the Madkhali Salafists in Libya are based on the deposed leader Muammar Gaddafi's desires to use Al-Jam'iyya against the Islamic movements there and to benefit from its views on the absolute obedience towards the ruler. It is stated that the third son of Gaddafi, As-Saadi Gaddafi, played a key role in the rapprochement between the Gaddafi regime and Madkhali Salafists (Alquds, 2020). Since they are supported by Gaddafi, the Madkhali Salafists have close ties with the deposed regime's intelligence and security forces. They are also referred to as "Al-Saadi's Community" due to the support they received from Al-Saadi Gaddafi, who went to the mosques of the Madkhali Salafists and listened to their lectures and grew his beard like them (Annabaa, 2019). The Madkhali Salafists captured many mosques in the country with the support of the Gaddafi regime. According to data from 2017, it is said that half of the mosques in the capital Tripoli are under the control of the Madkhali Salafists (Fettuh, 2019).

The Madkhali Salafists, who fought under the command of Haftar, name the government and its soldiers under the leadership of Fayez al-Sarraj as "the-dogs-of-hell-Kharijites" and claim that they fought for Erdogan, whom they insulted as the "enemy of Allah" and the "enemy of Muslims and Arabs"¹⁰. Abu Abdu-rrahman al-Mekki, one of the students of Rabee al-Madkhali, told the Madkhali Salafists who were fighting under Haftar in Libya that "they were fighting in the name of Allah" and that "they were in Jihad" (Youtube, 2020a). Abdülfettah bin Galbun, one of the leading names of the Libyan Madkhali Salafists, claimed that they were fighting against the "Kharijites" from all over the world, and invited his supporters in Tripoli to support Haftar against the "Kharijites" and the "Muslim Brotherhood"¹¹.

The Libyan Madkhali Salafists do not hesitate to make absurd speeches to support Haftar with propaganda and motivate his followers. For instance, one of them stated that Haftar was an "exceptional" person, that he would definitely win a victory that he would have the highest rank in the world after conquering Tripoli, and therefore the whole world was against him, that Allah did not kill Haftar in order the Libyan people win through him (Thenewkhalij, 2020).

The Foundations and Islamic Affairs Council affiliated to the Tobruk Parliament is under the control of the Madkhali Salafis. The Tobruk Parliament and Haftar allow the Madkhali Salafists to oppress the Sufis and demolish their tombs. In February, 2017 Osama Al-Nazuri, one of the commanders of the Haftar forces, after the Sau-

⁹ For the audio recording of Rebii al-Madkhali's fatwa, see (Youtube, 2019)

¹⁰ See the video recording of the Al Jazeera TV reporter, the Libyan journalist Ahmed Khalifa, on his Twitter account (Halifa, 2020)

¹¹ For the video recording of Abdülfettah bin Galbun, see (Face). book, 2019)



di Arabian Osama Al-Otaibi's visited the east of Libya, banned women from traveling without their mahram (husband, brother, and/or father). However, this decision was later abandoned due to the reactions from the public. Three Libyan youngsters, who were organizing the Soil Day celebration in Benghazi, under the control of Haftar's forces, were detained on the grounds that the celebration was bid'ah (Ali, 2018).

The forces fighting under Haftar's command in Libya have committed many war crimes, both during their attacks on Tripoli and in the regions they occupied. Mahmoud Mustafa Al-Werfalli, one of the commanders of Haftar's forces and one of the notorious names of the Madkhali Salafis in Libya, has been arrested by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the war crimes (ICC) he committed. Many mass graves have been unearthed in the city of Terhune, which was rescued by the legitimate government forces on June 5th. The ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, said that reliable information reached the prosecutor's office that there were 11 mass graves in Terhune and its surroundings and that the mass graves in question could constitute evidence for "war crimes" or "crimes against humanity" (AA, 2020). It is known that the Madkhali Salafists are also partners in the crimes committed by the forces fighting under the command of Haftar and the massacres they carried out in Terhune. Therefore, while preparing files on war crimes committed in Libya and mass graves in Terhune, it is necessary to draw attention to the roles of the Madkhali Salafists who killed innocent people under the name of fatwas.

Conclusion

Madkhali Salafism, which targets Islamic personalities and sects with the support of states, such as: Saudi Arabia and the UAE, area growing problem which poses threats towards the stability of the Islamic countries, especially Libya. It cannot be ignored that the seeds sown by the movement financed by the dictatorial regimes, which fear the manifestation of the public will, and the space opened for its spread, increase the potential for internal conflict in Muslim societies. Deciphering the Madkhali Salafists', the mission and refuting their arguments, which were recently armed and employed in crisis zones to tilt the balance of power and used as a theopolitical weapons, will contribute to neutralizing the given threat. The Madkhali Salafists, which Saudi Arabia produced to use against the Al-Sahwa movement and later expanded its use, turned into an armed organization, as seen in the examples of Yemen and Libya. In the light of the evidence to be collected about the murders they committed in Yemen and Libya, efforts should be made to classify the Madkhali Salafis as a "terrorist organization" and to reveal the connection between the organization and its theorists, and those who led the organization to murder under their fatwas to be prosecuted. This kind of work will narrow the range of action of the Madkhali Salafists. If the Madkhali Salafists, who have turned into another version of the DAESH, cannot be restrained by the pressure of the international community in the upcoming period, they will probably continue to fight in other areas of conflict in line with the fatwas from Saudi Arabia.



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“Tanıtım nüshasıdır, para ile satılamaz.”
“Bandrol Uygulamasına İlişkin Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmeliğin 5’inci maddesinin
2’nci fıkrası çerçevesinde bandrol taşıması zorunlu değildir.”

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